Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 10

Issue 1

Article 3

1-1-1993

Agatheism: A Justification of the Rationality of Devotion to God
Richard E. Creel

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Creel, Richard E. (1993) "Agatheism: A Justification of the Rationality of Devotion to God," Faith and
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 10 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil199310110
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol10/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

AGATHEISM: A JUSTIFICATION OF THE
RATIONALITY OF DEVOTION TO GOD
Richard E. Creel

First I argue that evidentialism, fideism, and consequentialism are unsatisfactory ways of evaluating the rationality of devotion to God. Next I argue
that an adequate evaluation of the rationality of such devotion must be an
axiological enterprise. But given the perfect-being conception of God as
infinitely perfect goodness, it follows that no individual could be a greater
good or would ensure greater good than God. Therefore, it seems rational to
hope that and live as though God exists as long as there is no conclusive
proof that God does not exist.

I. Introduction
My objectives in this paper are twofold: to critique three approaches to the
evaluation of the rationality of devotion to God, and to develop and defend
a fourth approach that I think has much to offer. Before proceeding to my
critiques, here is how I will be using several key terms.
The use of "God" that I shaH start out with is that which, broadly speaking,
is found in the personalistic, monotheistic traditions of Judaism, Christianity,
and Islam, according to which God is a personal being who created, sustains,
and guides the universe. This is what Thomas Morris calls "the creation
conception of God," as distinguished from "the perfect-being conception of
God. "I I begin with the creation conception of God because it is that conception which enables many people to gain negative leverage on the question of
the rationality of devotion to God. 2 Later I will give reasons for rejecting that
conception and preferring the perfect-being conception.
The concept I intend by "devotion" to God is that of a consciously Godcentered life that consists of endeavoring to live wholeheartedly according
to the will and spirit of God as best one understands them, and ever endeavoring for a better understanding of them, such endeavor arising from gratitude
and adoration. Theistic devotion is the self-conscious endeavor to enter and
maintain-and perhaps more important, to re-enter and maintain-a right
relationship to God. 3
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II. Propositional Attitudes
I should also say how I shall be using "knowledge," "belief," "faith," and
"hope." In ordinary language these terms are interrelated so closely as to
muddle philosophical as well as lay discussions. However, my primary concern is not with these terms; it is with four concepts associated with them
that I have found very useful when kept distinct. Consequently I will give
these concepts sharp edges so that each of the preceding terms will be associated with a distinct conceptual contribution, and so that together they will
cover most of what I want to say about religious reasoning and devotion.
By "knowledge" I shall in this paper mean knowing that one knows. The
distinction between knowing and knowing that one knows is an important
one that I accept, but it is the latter kind of know ledge, viz., the kind we know
we have, that is our objective when we are, for example, examining or constructing arguments for or against the existence of God. Consequently, for
the purposes of this paper I will use "knows that p" as synonymous with
"knows that one knows that p."4
"Belief," as I shall use the term here, consists of thinking that a proposition
is true because of reasons or evidence which one thinks do not prove that the
proposition is true but do indicate that it is probably true.
"Faith," as I shall use the term here, is conceptually distinct from knowledge and belief because although it is a conviction that p is true, it is a-conviction-not-derived-from-evidence-or-argument. In ordinary language "faith"
is associated most closely with religious conviction, but the concept of faith
I am using here is not limited in scope to religious conviction. In my sense
one can have faith that a kidnaped child is still alive, that there is life on
other planets, and that the laws of nature will not change. 5
By "hope that p is true" I mean desire that p be true because one thinks
that it would be good if it were true, and intention to make p true insofar as
it is possible and appropriate. Sometimes hope does not motivate action
because one thinks it impossible that one's action could contribute to the
realization of what one hopes, e.g., that there is now life on another planet
in our solar system. Regarding occasions on which one believes that one's
action would contribute to the realization of what one hopes, we need to keep
in mind that there are two very different kinds of thing that one might intend
to realize by one's action. On the one hand, one's action might be intended
to contribute to the actualization of a desired entity, as when one hopes that
one can construct a house for oneself and acts on that hope. On the other
hand, one's action might be intended to contribute to the actualization of a
desired relation with an entity that one thinks exists, as when one writes and
mails letters to one's mate, long held hostage by terrorists, in the hope that
she is receiving them but without having any reason for more than a year to
think that she is still receiving them, and having some reason to think that
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she is no longer alive. Because action is motivated by desire and guided by
knowledge, belief, and/or faith, I hope to show that hope can playa profound
and pervasive role in motivating a rational religious life. 6

III. Rationality and Religious Devotion
Now for my critique of three approaches to the evaluation of religious devotion: evidentialism, fideism, and consequentialism. These terms, too, are in
common use, but without standardized meanings, so again I plead for indulgence in the hope that my uses of these terms are sufficiently close kin of
other uses to allow me into the family debate. My objective is to develop a
typology that maps onto life in useful ways.

A. Evidentialism
The famous troika of John Locke, David Hume, and W. K. Clifford articulated
the central thesis of evidentialism when they insisted that belief should be
proportioned to evidence. In Clifford's exquisite words, "It is wrong always,
everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence."7
From that thesis, together with the point that it would be irrational to be
devoted to something that one did not believe to exist, it follows that religious
devotion is rational only if available evidence indicates clearly that there is
or probably is a God. Hence, it is an evidentialist sentiment that sufficient
evidence for belief that God exists is a necessary condition for rational devotion to God. Therefore, if one's research regarding the existence of God
shows that the probability of the existence of God is 50/50 or less, then it
would be wrong for one to begin or continue to be devoted to God.

B. Fideism
Fideism does not agree with evidentialism that a positive balance of evidence
that God exists is a necessary condition of a rational conviction that God
exists. Fideism holds that it can be perfectly rational to affirm as true a
proposition that one cannot prove or even show to be probably true. If this
weren't so, it claims, we would all be hopelessly irrational because having
such convictions is natural and inescapable in any viable form of human life.
Among the most common of such convictions are "Physical objects are made
of matter," "Other people have a SUbjective life," and "It is wrong to torture
an infant." Faith that God exists, it is claimed, is also a rational convictionor at least can be. Hence, as long as we have epistemically responsible faith
that God exists, we need not be deterred from devotion to God by inadequate
or conflicting evidence, or by a negative balance of evidence regarding the
existence of God. 8
To avoid some confusion, I note that there are two very different meanings
of "faith." The first meaning is that which, rightly or wrongly, is associated
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with S",ren Kierkegaard. According to this position, faith is an action, specifically, a free and unforced leap of affirmation. I will call this conception
of faith "actional faith."
Another prominent conception of faith views it as a passion, rather than an
action. The flavor of passional-fideism, as I shall call it, has been captured
superbly by David Hume. Hume says that evidence from our own senses is
the most powerful kind of evidence that we can have and that everything else,
such as memory and the testimony of other people, shades off quickly from
there. Hence, religious doctrines, such as the resurrection of Jesus, that have
been transmitted from the remote past and contradict experience and commonsense would never be held were they not "brought home to everyone's
breast, by the immediate operation of the Holy Spirit." Hume goes on to say
of the Christian religion that, "Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of
its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of
a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of
his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most
contrary to custom and experience. "9 I think Hume was wrong to say that
Christian faith subverts the principles of human understanding. One can have
Christian faith and be epistemically astute. 1O Moreover, one might in faith
hold something to be true which in no way is "contrary to custom and experience"; e.g., one who is lost in a forest at night might have passional faith
that she will be found unharmed. However, I think Hume was correct that
passional-faith occurs independently of the machinery of evidential justification and so is something that happens to one-whether or not by action of
the Holy Spirit. Passional-faith that God exists consists of a conviction that
was not arrived at by means of reasoning or evidence and that may survive
in spite of evidence that seems to count against its truth. It is this kind of
faith that I shall be speaking of herein, ordinarily.
However, even iffideism is correct that passional-faith that God exists does
not need to be justified evidentially in order to be rational, that does not entail
that devotion to God can be rational without being justified axiologicaLLy.
Devotion is a form of action and so cannot be adjudicated adequately apart
from a consideration of values. Hence, axiological justification of actionalfaith, which is a species of devotion, is called for even if evidential justification of passional-faith is not. There is a clear difference of kind between
being justified in having passional-faith that God exists and being justified
in being devoted to God. One might have faith that God, the personal creator
of the universe, exists, yet also conclude that devotion to God would be wrong
because God is morally indifferent, monstrous, or in some other way unworthy of devotion. Clearly, then, rational faith that God exists is not a sufficient
condition of rational devotion to God.
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C. Consequentialism
In contrast to evidentialism and fideism, the consequentialist approach to the
justification of religious devotion is axiological from the start: whether one
should be religious, and if so, how, is to be determined by comparing the
consequences of being religious and not being religious, and from comparing
the consequences of being religious in this way rather than that way. According to consequentialism, it might be rational to be devoted to God even if
there is not a preponderance of evidence in favor of God's existence, even if
one does not have passional-faith that God exists, and, indeed, even if one
has passional-faith that God does not exist.
Perhaps the clearest example of religious consequential ism is Pascal's
Wager. Whenever I present Pascal's Wager to my students, some of them
always object to it immediately because it is such a transparently self-serving
approach to the question of whether to devote oneself to God. It seems clear
that a Pascalian consequentialist would 'devote' herself to God not out of
reverence for God, but, rather, for the sake of achieving an end, such as
avoidance of hell or enjoyment of heaven. Moreover, a clear implication is
that if a consequentialist theist were to decide later that she had found a better
deal elsewhere, she would promptly take it and tum away from God, who
from the consequentialist point of view is only a means to an end.
Hence, consequentialism makes an absolute of something other than God,
viz., whomever or whatever is the intended beneficiary of the consequences
of one's being religious, and it subordinates to that beneficiary everything
else, including God. 11 But that seems to show that consequentialism is not
even compatible with devotion to God. It is a way of life that is a competitor
to religious devotion, so it cannot serve as a measure of the rationality of
religious devotion. Rather, the rationality of these two ways of life must be
judged by a higher criterion.
In conclusion, evidentialism is correct that we have moral obligations regarding our beliefs and our use of the term "belief," but-for reasons soon
to be stated-I think it would be wrong to hold that the rationality of devotion
to God turns upon the strength of one's evidence concerning the existence of
God (unless, of course, one believes one's evidence proves that there is no
God); fideism claims that affirmation of the existence of God need not be
justified by evidence in order to be rational, yet even if that is true, faith that
God exists is not a sufficient condition for rational devotion to God; consequentialism is wrong to hold that the rationality of religious devotion turns
upon its consequences for the devotee, but it is right that evaluation of
religious devotion is an axiological affair. Building on the last point, I tum
to my second objective, viz., development of a fourth approach to evaluation
of the rationality of religious devotion.
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D. Agathism & Agatheism
Development of this alternative will be facilitated by the introduction of two
words, "agathism" and "agatheism." I shall use "agathism" to refer to the
doctrine that one ought to endeavor always with all of one's heart, soul, mind,
and strength to understand what is the highest good and to be devoted wholeheartedly to it. If one thinks that the highest good is a natural possibility, such
as world-wide communism, then one ought to be devoted to actualizing that
possibility; if one thinks that the highest good is a supernatural actuality, such
as God, then one ought to be devoted to being related rightly to that actuality.
Agathism is explicitly axiological and agrees with consequentialism that
the proper court for evaluation of the rationality of religious devotion is not
the court of existential evidence but the court of axiological consideration.
But agathism does not agree with consequential ism that consequences are the
criteria of the rationality of religious devotion, or of any other way of life.
Agathism holds that the rationality of devotion is determined solely by the
intrinsic goodness of the object of devotion-a point to which we will return.
I shall use "agatheism" to refer to that species of agathism which holds that
the highest possible good, and therefore that to which we ought to be devoted,
is a unique, supremely perfect personal being, who is most fittingly called
"God." In this "perfect-being conception of God," the idea that conceptually
determines everything else about God is that God is perfect goodness.
To the agathist, then, the good life is a life devoted to the good, or more
precisely, to that good than which none greater can be conceived; to the
agatheist, the good life is a life devoted to God, who is that good than which
none greater can be conceived. Now for some thoughts about how one might
justify the doctrine of agatheism.

IV. God as Uniquely Worthy of Devotion
For more than 2000 years the nisus of middle-eastern and western thought
about God has been to conceive of God as the highest possible being, the
supremely perfect being, the being than which none greater can be conceived.
Part of the work of philosophical theology has been to examine that concept
for intelligibility and coherence and to draw out its implications as to which
attributes do not apply to God, which do, and how those that do should be
conceptualized. 12 This project was clearly at the heart of Gordon Kaufman's
book The Theoiogicailmagillation, which is subtitled, Constructing the Concept of God. In that book Kaufman says, "God is the perfect attachment-figure
to whom one's absolute loyalty and devotion can and should be given .... "13
What I want to say proceeds in that tradition, which Thomas Morris calls "the
Anselmian tradition" or "perfect being theology."
My foundational point is that a supremely perfect being must also be
supremely perfect goodness. I have spoken a great deal about goodness, and
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the concept of goodness is at the heart of my paper, so what do I mean by
"goodness"? I wish I could say in good conscience, "It's a simple property
that cannot be defined. You know what it means or you don't." But I cannot,
so I will say something briefly now and hope to pursue the issue more fully
in a subsequent paper.
To me it has been illuminating to explore Thomas Aquinas' conviction that
being and goodness are the same in reference but different in meaning, even
as "The Morning Star" and "The Evening Star" are the same in reference but
different in meaning. Nothing can be good apart from actuality, and nothing
can be actual without being good. From those convictions, which I will not
defend now, I infer that supremely perfect being is identical with supremely
perfect goodness, and vice-versa. 14 Moreover, it seems to me that a supremely
perfect being would be infinitely perfect goodness, and that infinitely perfect
goodness would be a person who is not characterized by envy or cruelty or
indifference to the welfare of others, but, rather, by fairness, graciousness,
justice, mercy, compassion, and agape love.
It is crucial here to keep in mind that moral goodness is not the only kind
of goodness; power and knowledge are also goods. Consequently, in order
for a being with moral attributes to be supremely perfect, those attributes
must be complemented by the attributes of perfect knowledge and perfect
power. A perfectly loving being who was ignorant of what love called for or
was impotent to do what love called for would not be infinitely perfect
goodness and therefore would not be a supremely perfect being.
It also seems clear that infinitely perfect goodness could not exist merely
as an unactualized possibility or a Platonic form or a concept in human minds;
rather, it must exist as a fully actual individual. Hence, being actual, as well
as omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent, is a necessary condition of
being infinitely perfect goodness, i.e., of being God.
V. The Rationality of Devotion to God
I think that the concept of a supremely perfect being is intelligible and
coherent, and I believe that this being, and this being alone, would be worthy
of unqualified devotion. Any lesser being would be less worthy of such
devotion because it would be less good in some respect.
One reason to hope that there is such a being is because if there is, then
reality is all the more wonderful for including an individual than which none
greater can be conceived. Such a hope seems analogous to hoping that reality
includes mineral, plant, and animal life even more wonderful than that of
which we are already aware-or, perhaps better, includes forms of life that
are as much more wonderful than animal life than animal life is more wonderful than plant life. Another reason for hoping that there is a God is because
if there is a God, then in spite of the fact that there seem to be possible worlds
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that are too meaningless or horrible to be worthy of existence, this world is
not one of them, as God would not create or allow a world that was not
sufficiently good to be worthy of existence. 15
To be sure, to hope that God exists is not to know that God exists, and
religious devotees should be responsive to arguments which claim to prove
that there is no God, but they need not be concerned about probability or
plausibility arguments against the existence of God. 16 Those who conceive
of God as infinitely perfect goodness will, as long as they rationally think it
possible that there is a God, be quite rational in continuing to hope that God
exists. What could be more wonderful than that supremely perfect goodness
be actual? How could it be irrational to have and maintain such a hope? It
seems axiomatic that the better a possibility is, the better it would be if it
were actual. If that is true, it seems eminently rational to hope that that
possibility than which none greater can be conceived, viz., God, is actual.
Even if you agree that it is rational to hope that there is a God, you still
might want to know how in the absence of evidential probability that there
is a God it could be rational to live as though there were a God, so let's
consider an analogy that does not involve God. It would not be irrational for
me to continue to search a lake and its environs for a child that I concede,
along with everyone else, has almost certainly drowned. If you ask me if I
believe that the child has drowned, then I will say "yes" -but I will add that
I hope that my belief is false and that I think that my continued efforts to
find the child alive are justified by the great good that would obtain were I
to succeed.
Consider also that the more probable nuclear war becomes, the harder we
should work to prevent it-even if it becomes improbable that we can succeed. The justification of sllch behavior in spite of daunting odds would be
the evil that would be averted and the good that would be achieved if we
succeeded.
To be sure, if someone proves to our satisfaction that Sllccess in these
matters is impossible, then it would be irrational for us to pursue it. Conviction that an end is impossible to achieve precludes rational efforts to achieve
it. But short of that extremity, there is a kind of sliding scale or correlation
between how good something would be and how justified we would be in
being devoted to it in spite of unfavorable odds. Hence, devotion in spite of
highly unfavorable odds is not necessarily irrational. Indeed, such devotion
might be the height of rationality-as it is, I think, in the case of those people
who are desperately trying to save our natural environment in spite of a
decreasing probability that they can succeed. In brief, adequate evaluation of
the rationality of action inescapably involves axiological considerations, and
the more important something is, the more justified one is in being devoted
to it.
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An obvious disanalogy between the preceding examples and the case of
religious devotion is that our actions can make a difference to whether an
endangered child is saved or nuclear war is averted, but they will make no
difference to whether there is a God. Recall, however, that in addition to
actions that save, maintain, or produce an entity or state of affairs that is
intrinsically good, such as a child or world peace, there are actions that are
intended to maintain or actualize a right relation to an actual good (or what
is thought to be an actual good). Devotion to God belongs to this second type
of action.
If there is a God, then it seems plausible that the highest level of being for
a creature is to exist in a right relation to God, who is supreme goodness. For
a rational creature that would involve knowing God in one's mind, acknowledging God in one's heart, and honoring God in one's actions. If there is no
God but only a concept of God, then still, it seems to me, as long as we do
not know that there is no God, the life than which none better can be lived
by a human being is a life lived as though there is a God. Why? Because such
a life would involve an ongoing effort to conceive of the highest good and
to live according to it.
Clearly, however, it can be or become irrational to pursue an improbable
objective. If a person urgently needs $10, it would be irrational for her to bet
her only $10 to win $15 with a 2 out of 5 chance of winning. Also, if
continuing to search for a child which has almost certainly drowned would
seriously endanger the lives of other people for whom one is responsible,
then although one may continue to hope that the child is alive and will return
safely, one should not continue to search.
Isn't there also going to be a point beyond which the improbability of the
existence of God rationally precludes devotion to God? For two reasons, I
do not think so. First, if one accepts the principle that I argued for earlier,
viz., that it can be rational to pursue an end even when one believes that it is
not probable that a necessary condition of achieving that end obtains, then
we must allow prima facie the possibility that it is not irrational to be devoted
to God when one thinks it is not probable that God exists. Allowing this means
that there cannot be a clean evidential cut-off point, such as not probable
(50% or less) or improbable (less than 50%), at and below which it is irrational to be devoted to God. No lower number short of 0% would seem to
objectively obligate cessation of devotion.
If the preceding is correct, my critic might respond that devotion is one
among a set of mutually exclusive alternatives. If we choose devotion to God,
it is at the expense of something else. Consequently, when the probability of
the success of religious devotion is sufficiently low because of the low probability of the existence of God, then the higher probability of achieving some
other good which is incompatible with devotion to God might render irratio-
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nal the choosing of devotion to God over that other good. By comparison, if
the probability is very high that John, age 95, is brain dead, and the probability is very high that Jack, age 5, can be saved by an operation and return
to a normal life, but neither of them can survive without the aid of a machine
that can serve only one of them, then it would be irrational to take Jack off
the machine in order to save John. Similarly, if a person believes that the
probability that she can enjoy a certain good is higher than the probability
that she can have a right relation to God (because she thinks that the probability that God exists is low), wouldn't it be irrational for her to choose the
good of a right relation to God over the other good?
If we approach this question quantitatively, then presumably for each alternative we need to multiply the evidence factor by the value factor and
prefer that alternative with the highest probability/value product. But God is
infinitely good, so any positive evidential decimal number, no matter how
small, multiplied by infinity will be larger than any positive evidential decimal number multiplied by a finite number (to represent the finite good that
is the alternative to God), no matter how large. Hence, it does not seem
irrational to place a right relation to God ahead of every other good.
Furthermore, the insistence that we must choose between God and other
goods is a false dilemma because being rightly related to God is compatible
with any other good which is worthy of choice; indeed, a right relation to
God would seem to be the best way of ensuring that one is rightly related to
other goods. For example, it might seem that there could be a conflict between
how one relates to God and how one relates to one's children (e.g., neglecting
one's children for religious reasons), but this, too, turns out to be a false
dilemma because of God's will for those children.
More generally, it is by our understanding of God that we should discern
how we should relate to God and others.17 Moreover, as long as we do not
know for certain that God does not exist, it seems impossible that there could
be an obligation which would rationally preclude devotion to God conceived
as supreme goodness. To be sure, our existential beliefs should be determined
by our evidence, but our actions should be oriented to the good. A critic might
ask, "But don't we have an obligation to live our lives according to how
actuality probably is and not merely according to how we would like it to
be?" Yes and no. In what way and to what extent we should take existential
probability into account is an axiological matter. Agatheism does not involve
a disregard for reality, but it recognizes that values playa critical role in the
determination of rational action.
Perhaps the last point puts into relief a watershed between two approaches
to life: the one approach says that in order to act rationally we must first
determine what reality is or probably is (in the pertinent respects) and then
the values we act on should be tailored to that picture of reality; for example,
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if it does not seem to a person that there probably is a God, then that person
should act only on values that are not predicated on the concept of God. The
other side says that rational action is primarily value driven so that to act
rationally consists primarily of acting so as to promote what one considers
to be the greatest good in the situation. Hence, how the relevant existential
probabilities are to be taken into account is itself an axiological issue, as is
indicated by the examples of the lost child and the prospects of nuclear war
and ecological disaster. It could be rational to pursue the child, world peace,
and a sound ecology in spite of the improbabilities of success, and it could
be rational to pursue a right relation to God in spite of its appearing improbable that God exists.
In brief, it is the belief of the agatheist that the concept of God is the most
adequate concept of the supreme good and that, therefore, if God exists, then
the best thing for any of us is to be rightly related to God. If God does not
exist, then the agatheist is nonetheless living a rational life by endeavoring
to live according to the greatest good that she can conceive.
It is important to note that according to agatheism God is worthy of devotion not because he can do us the most good, though he can, but simply
because he is the most good-indeed, is unsurpassable goodness and therefore is uniquely worthy of unqualified awe, adoration, and allegiance. That
is why agatheism is not a form of consequentialism. The devotion of the
agatheist is not for the sake of a consequence of the devotion; it is because
the devotion is right in itself.
Still, insofar as we are concerned that history not be meaninglessly painful
and tragic, it seems to me that it is rational to hope that there is a God, for
in so hoping we would be hoping that there is someone who can and will
redress and redeem as much as is possible the injustices and cruelties of
history. IS Not to hope that there is a God seems to me presumptuous or
callous-as though one thinks one knows that the injustices and cruelties of
history cannot be redressed or as though one doesn't care whether they are
redressed. To hope that there is not a God seems to me monstrous-as though
one approves and applauds the sufferings and severed lives of others, e.g.,
families that have been traumatically separated by slavery or terrorism, and
individuals who have been struck down before or during their creative
prime. 19
As is obvious and was noted earlier, our hoping will make not a bit of
difference to whether there is a God. Rather, religious hoping is expressive
of what one thinks is or would be the highest good. Does this mean that
religious hope will end in idle sentiment? that the religious devotee will spend
her life praising God and neglecting God's creatures? Not at all. It seems to
follow from the concept of God as infinitely perfect goodness that God loves
his creatures and desires their welfare. To be sure, if God exists, then God is
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the greatest actual good. However, the Kingdom of God, i.e., a community
of creatures who are in a right relationship with God and therefore with
one another, is the greatest potential good. Hence, whereas hope that God
exists cannot rationally motivate us to do anything to make it true that
God exists, it should motivate us to do all we can to actualize the Kingdom
of God. 20
Consequently, it is intriguing that David Hume, who has shaken the belief
of so many theists, was, I think, right or very close to right in suggesting that
..... the most genuine method of serving the divinity is by promoting the
happiness of his creatures." Martin Buber and Philip Phenix expressed a
similar sentiment by saying that we serve God best by building community.21
Even if the classical conception of God is correct that God needs nothing
from us and therefore wants nothing from us for himself, that does not mean
that God wants nothing from us. Reason and scripture testify independently
that God, a perfectly good person, wants us to promote the well-being of
ourselves and others. Insofar as God wants us to be devoted to himself, it is
not because he needs devotion; it is because he knows that our fulfillment
lies in a right relationship to him. It seems, then, that the ethical implications
of agatheism include all that is best in humanistic ethics and then some, as
the God of whom I speak is the just but wise and loving sovereign of all. By
the grace of such a God and in God's Kingdom all worthy humanistic ideals
will be fulfilled, including freedom, justice, beauty, truth, and compassion.
The concept of God, then, is the concept of the greatest possible individual;
the concept of the Kingdom of God is the concept of the greatest possible
society that includes free creatures. God is either actual or impossible. If God
is actual, then the Kingdom of God is possible-but potential rather than
actual. We cannot actualize God, but we can help actualize the Kingdom of
God. Given the nature of that kingdom, surely it is rational to hope it is
possible and to do all we can to actualize it on earth as fully as we can while
calling on God's grace for guidance, strength, forgiveness, and transformation-recognizing that God alone can take his kingdom to completion. 22
I would like to focus what I've been saying by adapting a point from S"ren
Kierkegaard, who said that what oxygen is to breathing, possibility is to hope.
The most important possibility, I submit, is the possibility that there is a God.
If there is a God, then the conditions for maximal creaturely good are optimal-at least so far as they are not dependent on the free choices of creatures.
For this reason the agatheist need not feel troubled by the flitting specter of
Great Pumpkin arguments which claim that allowing hope to be based on
mere possibility would open a Pandora's box of silly and irrational hopes. In
hoping that God exists, the agatheist is hoping that something exists which
subsumes all other goods and ensures that creaturely goods will be optimized
to the extent that free creatures are devoted to God.
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In conclusion, when God is thought of as infinitely perfect goodness, it
seems consummately rational to hope that there is a God and to live as though
there is, as long as there is no conclusive proof that there is not. Until such
a proof is produced, it seems to me that Blaise Pascal was correct when he
said: " ... there are two kinds of people one can call reasonable; those who
serve God with all their heart because they know Him, and those who seek
Him with all their heart because they do not know Him. "23
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NOTES
l. See Thomas V. Morris, Anselmiall Explorations: Essays ill Philosophical Theology
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987).

2. Among those people are David Hume's fictitious Philo, who many think speaks for
Hume in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. See also Maurice De Bona, Jr., who
says in his God Rejected (Culver City, California: Desserco Publishing, 1976), p. 3: "[But
even] if there is a God, there is no reason why he should be perfect."
3. I think it is of devotion that Moses is speaking in Deuteronomy 6:5 and Jesus in
Matthew 22:37. Also, there is a wonderful passage on devotion in Rene Descartes' The
Passions of the Soul, Part Two, Paragraph 83.
4. In English "know" is used sometimes to mean that one knows that one knowsthough we usually put some 'English' on the word when we use it that way, as when we
say, "I know that's the case!" "Know" is used also for non-probative knowledge. When
we use the locution "A knows that p" to mean conjointly that A is justified in thinking
that p and that p is true, we allow that we can know that p without knowing that we know
that p, as the causes of or reasons for our thinking that p may justify our thinking that p
without proving that p. However, if our reasons are not probative, then even though we
know that p, we would not be justified in claiming to know that we know that p, as we
do not know that we know that p-though we might be justified in claiming to believe
that we know that p. But, then, how can non-probative knowledge figure into assessing
whether we are being rational in thinking that p or performing some action that presupposes a conviction that p? In such an assessment, mustn't non-probative knowledge be
assessed on the basis of probability, coherence, or some other criterion, as we do not know
whether what we think in the mode of non-probative knowledge is knowledge or not? So
isn't the fact that our non-probative knowledge is knowledge an epistemically useless,
because unknown, fact? It is for these kinds of reasons that for present purposes I focus
on the contrast between probative knowledge and evidential belief, leaving aside the
concept of non-probative knowledge.
To be sure, if p is true, then I would rather non-probatively know that p than not know
it at all, but I would rather know that I know it than merely know it. Moreover, I think that
insofar as we as philosophers are operating under the lure of an epistemic ideal, that ideal
is to achieve knowledge that we know that p, and not merely to achieve non-probative
knowledge that p (which we never know that we have even when we have it). Our objective
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as philosophers is to achieve as much knowledge as we can by means of reason, and
to achieve knowledge by means of reason is in its strongest fonn to know that we
know.
To be sure, construing "knows" to mean "knows that one knows" generates an infinite
regress because it entails that for the "knows" at the end of every "knows that one knows"
one can substitute "knows that one knows." However, the regress is benign for two
reasons. First, as explained above, it is a logical fact that the regress is infinite, but it need
not be a psychological fact. The logical fact entails that whenever I know that I know
something, then in principle I could merely by reflection know an infinite number of things
because merely by reflecting on the fact that I know that I know, I could know that I know
that I know, and so on, ad infinitum. However, the in-principle-possibility of this infinite
regress does not entail that I must have completed such a regress in order to know that I
know that p. Rather, the logical infinitude of the regress requires only that in order to know
that I know that p, I must understand that there is such a regress and that nothing in the
regress could undennine my knowing that I know that p. For example, I know that I know
that in the decimal expansion of one-third there is no number larger or smaller than 3
because although I have not examined the infinite string of discrete numbers in the decimal
expansion of one-third, nonetheless by virtue of my understanding of the relevant mathematical concepts and their relations, I understand that it is impossible that there could be
any number other than a 3 in the decimal expansion of one-third.
I examine some of these issues more fully in "Faith as Imperfect Knowledge," Logos,
vol. 12 (1991), pp. 51-55.

5. Patrick Lee and, I think, Thomists in general use "opinion" as I use "belief' and
"belief' as I use "faith." See Lee's "Reasons and Religious Belief," Faith & Philosophy,
volume 6, number 1, January 1989, pp. 19-34.
6. These characteristics of hope are adequate for my purposes here, but hope is, of
course, a much richer concept and phenomenon. See, for example, Stewart Sutherland's
"Hope," in The Philosophy in Christianity, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, \989), pp. \93-206. Sutherland agrees with Jonathan Harrison that we
cannot meaningfully hope for what we think to be impossible or inevitable, and he
discusses whether we must think that what we hope for is probable or causally possible.
See also Joseph J. Godfrey's A Philosophy of Human Hope (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff,
1987), and chs. 6 and 7 of Richard Creel's Religion and Doubt, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1991).

7. Louis P. Pojam, ed., Philosophy of Religion (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing
Company, 1987), p. 387
8. My conception of fideism is broad enough to include John Calvin, Blaise Pascal,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Alvin Plantinga, though Plantinga rejects a narrow fonn of
fideism. Faith, as I construe it, is identical with or close family kin of what Plantinga
means by "basic belief." I hope to pursue this connection another time.

9. Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Pub. Co.,
1977), pp. 73,90.
10. Consider, for example, the epistemological works of Christians such as William
Alston, Robert Audi, Alvin Plantinga, and Richard Swinburne.
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11. The most damning analysis of religious consequentialism of which I know is in
David Hume's The Natural History of Religion, Hume berates it as calculating, ignoble,
and based on fear and lust. It makes a god of one's hedonic state and subordinates
everything else to it, including God. Hume had in mind the lowest forms of consequentialism, though clearly there can be more noble forms. Still, the troubling principle of
creaturely exaltation (whether of oneself, another individual, the nation, the species, the
environment, etc.) seems to characterize all of its forms.
12. Norman Kretzmann has explored some of the differences between philosophical
theology and natural theology. It is the latter that is interested in arguments for and against
the existence of God. See Kretzmann's "Reason in Mystery," in The Philosophy in
Christianity, ed. Godfrey Vesey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp.
\5-39. See also Scott MacDonald's "Natural TheologY/Theodicy" in the Handbook of
Metaphysics and Ontology (Munchen: Philosophia Verlag, 1991).
13. Kaufman, The Theologicallmaginatioll (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), p. 70.
14. For exquisitely helpful papers on Thomas' theory of the identity of being and
goodness, see Being alld Goodness, ed. Scott MacDonald (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 1990). See especially the papers by Kretzmann, Stump, and MacDonald.
For a brilliant statement of the same thesis by St. Augustine, see his "The Nature of the
Good," pars. i-xxiii, xxxiv, xxxvi, and xxxvii, in Augustine: Earlier Writings, ed. J. H. S.
Burleigh (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953).
15. This paragraph might seem to reveal agatheism to be a form of consequentialism,
but I think it does not. The good consequences of God existing are a reason for hoping
that God exists, but they are not the right reason for being devoted to God. The end of
religion is the appreciation and glorification of God by his creatures. To be sure, the Gospel
says that an aim of God is the salvation of humankind, and that is why the Gospel is good
news, but such salvation is something for humans to accept and be grateful for, not to be
devoted to. It is God to whom we should be devoted-not because of the good that he can
or has or will do for us, but simply because he is perfect goodness.
16. Agatheists are not hostile to natural theology, but they are concerned to show that
the success or failure of natural theology to demonstrate or defend the existence of God
is not the pivot upon which turns the rationality of religious devotion, except in the case
of a conclusive proof or disproof of the existence of God.
17. It is the logic of this thesis, I think, that produced the sentiments in Amos 5:21-24,
Micah 6:6-8, Matthew 25, I John 3:17-18, James 1:27 and 2:15, and other such biblical
statements.
18. Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant seem to be the pioneers of this position.
See Rousseau's "Profession of Faith of the Savoyard Vicar," in Book IV of Emile, and
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Part I, Bk. II, Ch. II, Sec. V.
19. It is not uncommon for religious hope to be egocentrically motivated, but hope that
there is a God need not be egocentrically motivated even when the hoper knows that she
will benefit if her hope is true.
20. See Stewart Sutherland's discussion of this point in "Hope," pp. 198-202, cited
above in note 6. Sutherland conceptualizes religious or metaphysical hope as "a moral
vision of what might be," discusses differences between the religious hope for heaven and
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the secular hope for utopia, and points out that the content of religious hope can serve as
"a basis for the critical evaluation of our world, rather than a flight from it."

21. The Natural History of Religion (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press,
1957), p. 72. See Philip H. Phenix's Intelligible Religion (New York: Harper & Brothers,
n.d.) and Education and the Common Good (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1961). See
Martin Buber's I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970) and Paths in Utopia
(New York: Macmillan, 1988).
22. This last point, as Sutherland explains, is a pivotal difference between the secular
understanding of utopia and the religious understanding of God's kingdom. See his
"Hope," pp. 202-05, cited above in note 6.
23. Blaise Pascal, Pensies, trans. W. F. Trotter (New York: The Modem Library, 1941),
#194. Or see #427 in Blaise Pascal, Pensies, trans. A. J. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin
Books, 1966).
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